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Abstract: This paper surveys China’s globalization in terms of in and out flows of goods, capital, 
information/technology and people from both the Chinese and the Western, especially American, 
points of view. It includes a discussion of the issue of revaluation of the RMB. 
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Globalization and China’s Economic and Financial Development
1 
 
To understand China’s economic reform and development since 1978 one may 
conveniently divide the topic into its domestic and international aspects even though the 
two are closely related. It is the purpose of this essay to examine the international aspects 
as China has taken part in the process of world economic globalization, a salient feature 
of world history today. The Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping who initiated and directed 
economic reform from a planned to a market economy understood the importance of 
globalization and adopted what he called an “open-door policy” as an essential part of his 
reform program. 
 
The term globalization refers to the crossing of national boundaries. It means the flow of 
goods, capital, information/technology and people across national borders. China 
practiced globalization in the Han dynasty (206BC-220AD) when trade took place 
between the Han Chinese and neighboring people in the North-west through the Silk 
Route. During the Tang dynasty (618-901) trade flourished and the Silk Route expanded 
as Chinese traded with the Romans. However, in the Qing Dynasty and in the period of 
the PRC up to Deng Xiaoping’s open-door policy China tried to close its doors and 
resisted globalization. I will survey the accomplishments of globalization for China’s 
economic development and clarify some controversial issues concerning globalization.  
 
1. Foreign Trade 
 
First consider foreign trade or the flow of goods across national borders. Since 1978 
China has encouraged free trade and abolished trade restrictions step by step. The 
government has changed its policy from the administration of foreign trade by the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade, to giving provincial governments much autonomy in foreign 
trade and to allowing private enterprises to engage in foreign trade. The total volume of 
foreign trade or the total volume of exports and imports increased from 20.64 billion US 
dollars in 1978 to 620.8 billion in 2002, accounting for 65 percent of GDP and was 
growing at the rate of 35 percent per year. In 2004, the trade volume reached 1.1 trillion 
US dollars, and had a growth rate of 30 percent. China became the third largest trading 
country in the world, next to the United States and Germany. 
 
Today exports from China can be found all over the world. In terms of US-China 
economic relations exports from China have benefited many Americans in providing 
them with high-quality consumer goods at low prices, but have also generated resentment 
and resistance by some American manufacturers and workers. Chinese exports to the US 
may hurt some US industries producing similar products. US workers in these industries 
may suffer temporarily, but in the long-run the labor market is able to adjust as new 
industries are developed to hire the displaced workers. In the long run, the aggregate 
unemployment rate (now at 5 percent) has not been visibly affected by the American 
imports of foreign goods. Note also that exports from China, in fact about 60 percent of 
them, are produced by foreign invested enterprises in China and some are American 
companies.  
                                                 
1 Comments welcomed.   2
 
Outsourcing of jobs such as having someone in Asia read X-ray or answer phones has 
also created resentment in the United States. From the economic point of view, 
outsourcing of jobs as illustrated above is the same as import of services from China. The 
effects are the same as for the import of goods produced in China that I just talked about. 
Such imports are good for China and for US although some workers may be displaced 
temporarily. Although this point is valid, Professor Greg Mankiw of Harvard and at the 
time Chairman of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers got into trouble when he 
made this valid point in a Congressional hearing in 2004 because such a viewpoint can be 
unpopular for American workers and politicians. 
 
As an importer China provides a large market for foreign manufacturers and has gained 
economic power as a result. Demand for imports to China propels economic growth of 
other countries in the world. China first took a mercantilist stand in the restriction of 
imports, but after the rapid expansion of Chinese exports, the table has turned as some 
developed countries including the US are considering the imposition of restrictions on 
imports from China. The imposition of quotas on textiles from China is an example.  
 
In 2001 China joined the World Trade Organization. Membership in WTO required 
China to lower its tariffs for manufacturing as well as agricultural products. The lowering 
of tariffs helped increase competition for Chinese manufacturers and farmers and provide 
cheaper products for Chinese consumers. 
 
Foreign trade has helped economic growth in China in three aspects. First international 
specialization that takes place as each country produces the goods for which it has a 
comparative advantage in producing will enable the country to obtain more goods than by 
domestic production alone. Second, exports are a part of aggregate demand and an 
increase in aggregate demand helps increase the country’s national output. Thirdly, trade 
together with foreign investment has brought in modern technology and method of 
management that has increased productivity in China. 
 
2. Foreign Investment  
 
A. Flow of physical capital in the form of foreign direct investment has been good in 
promoting China’s economic growth. Since economic reform started in 1978 China’s 
policy concerning foreign investment has made a 180 degree turn, from treating it as a 
form of exploitation by foreigners to welcoming it for China’s economic development. In 
the years 2001 to 2003, the amounts of direct foreign investment actually utilized were 
respectively 49.7, 55.0 and 56.1 billion US dollars. Foreign investment has provided 
physical and financial capital, technology, and management skill and practice to China. 
However foreign investment is not a fundamental economic factor in China’s rapid 
growth but only a vehicle propelling that growth. There are three fundamental factors, 
namely (1) abundance of high-quality human capital that includes skillful and 
hardworking laborers and resourceful entrepreneurs, (2) sufficiently well functioning 
market institutions and (3) the position of a late comer that can adopt modern technology   3
from the more developed countries. These three fundamental factors have enabled China 
to attract foreign capital; otherwise the capital could have been invested elsewhere.  
 
Now China is exporting capital, not only to less developed countries but also to the 
United States. Chinese investment has helped the economic development of some Asian 
and African countries. Investment in the United States is illustrated by the attempt in the 
Spring of 2005 by the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation Cnooc to buy Unocal 
in the United States although the attempt turned out to be unsuccessful. The attempt is a 
part of the free flow of capital. 
 
From the viewpoint of the United States, export of capital from US to China that takes 
place when a US factory moves from Cleveland to Shanghai is also considered a case of 
the outsourcing of jobs as the factory is supposed to go to Shanghai to take advantage of 
the less expensive and good quality labor in China. This case of outsourcing of jobs is 
different from simply buying goods or services from China that I talked about earlier 
since it takes the form of foreign investment. Capital flows to China in this case but not in 
the previous case that involves only foreign trade. Such an investment is good for the US 
as it raises US GNP. The reason is that what this piece of capital can produce in China is 
more than it could be producing in the US; otherwise the factory would not have moved. 
Therefore the move increases total output of the US which the economists call gross 
national product or GNP. The move, however, has a harmful effect on the workers in 
Cleveland who lose their jobs when such a factory moves. As in the case of competition 
from imports from China, there will be job loss in selected industries in the short run 
But aggregate employment in the US in the long run will not be affected. 
 
In the course of globalization there is movement of resources between nations. The 
movement is good for each nation in the long run but may have harmful effects in the 
short run for a segment of the population. The same can be said about the movement of 
economic resources between different regions of one country. In US history, the 
movement of textile factories from New England to the South to take advantage of the 
lower labor cost is good for the country’s economic development, both in New England 
and in the South. In New England some workers were displaced during the move but 
other industries were developed and people were employed again without leading to an 
increase in the unemployment rate in the region.  
 
On the negative side, there may be environmental problems associated with new factories 
built in the course of globalization, but this problem exists for domestically financed 
factories and for economic development in general. The Chinese government has paid 
serious attention to environment protection. Economists try to balance the harm from 
possible damage to the environment with the gain in having more output. In general 
poorer countries in the course of economic development are willing to accept some 
environmental degradation in exchange for more output but they should be aware of the 
damage which may be long-lasting. 
 
B. Concerning financial investment, the free flow of financial capital is one objective in 
the development of financial markets. China welcomes foreigner to invest in its stock   4
markets in Shenzhen, Shanghai and Hong Kong, and also desires to invest its capital 
abroad. Movement of financial capital is one aspect of the free flow of resources to where 
they yield the highest return so that total output of the world would be larger. In this 
connection I would like to call your attention to the fact that the working of the free 
market involving the free flow of resources was well understood by the great Chinese 
historian Sima Qian of the Han dynasty. In chapter 69 entitled “The biographies of the 
money markets” of his book Historical Records he wrote:  
 
“There must be farmers to produce food, men to extract the wealth of mountains and 
marshes, artisans to produce these things and merchants to circulate them. There is no 
need to wait for government orders: each man will play his part, doing his best to get 
what he desires. So cheap goods will go where they will fetch more, while expensive 
goods will make men search for cheap ones. When all work willingly at their trade, just 
as water flows ceaselessly downhill day and night, things will appear unsought and 
people will produce them without being asked. For clearly this accords with the Way and 
is in keeping with nature.” What he calls nature is what we call the law of economics. 
 
On the negative side of the free flow of financial capital it enables financial crises to take 
place, including the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8. This crisis did not affect China very 
much as the Chinese government has had a wise policy of adopting international financial 
reform at a moderate speed especially in allowing a gradual opening of financial markets 
and of the capital account in international finance because economic institutions are not 
ready. But globalization itself is good for the reform of banking and financial institutions 
in providing foreign competition to push the reform forward. Using foreign competition 
to speed up economic reform was the main reason for the former Premier Zhu Rongji in 
leading China to join the WTO in the first place. 
 
The strategy of using foreign competition to speed up economic reform of domestic 
institutions, however effective, has limitation in promoting the reform of China’s banking 
system and large state-owned enterprises for two reasons. First, while Chinese 
government officials have been pragmatic in most aspects of economic reform, they have 
been conservative and slow in allowing foreign banks to enter the domestic market. 
Second, Chinese banks and state enterprises are state-owned and controlled and operated 
by bureaucrats who can take advantage of the economic power conferred upon them to 
benefit themselves. Corruption is a major hindrance to economic reform at the current 
juncture of China’s economic development as I have discussed elsewhere. See Chow 
(2005) for a discussion of the problem of corruption and Allen, Qian and Qian (2005) that 
contains measures for China’s financial reform that may be hindered by corruption as 
well. 
   5
The Exchange Rate Issue 
 
An important determinant of foreign trade and foreign investment is the exchange rate. A 
low value of Chinese RMB makes Chinese exports cheaper and investment in China 
more attractive if the investment is to produce for export. Many countries in the world 
including those in the European Union, Japan and Taiwan, have adopted the flexible 
exchange rate system while China adopted a fixed exchange rate up to July 2005 but the 
government did change the fixed rate several times in the 1980s and early 1990s relative 
to the US dollar as its government deemed appropriate. Most recently the Chinese 
government has adopted a managed floating rate with the government deciding the rate 
around a small band daily relative to the value of a basket of foreign currencies but the 
basket is not explicitly specified. There are pros and cons of the fixed and the floating 
exchange rate systems. (See the Appendix for a more detailed discussion.) A fixed 
exchange provides an anchor for the government in the conduct of its monetary and fiscal 
policy. It limits the discretionary power of the government in the exercise of its monetary 
and fiscal policy that may lead to excessive inflation or deflation. An expansionary 
monetary or fiscal policy would lead to inflation and lower the value of the currency as 
compared with a more stable US currency. Thus the fixed exchange rate system might be 
good for a developing country which has difficulty in disciplining itself in the exercise of 
its monetary and fiscal policies. The flip side is the power that it gives up and its 
dependence on the monetary policy of the US if the exchange rate is fixed as in terms of 
the US dollar. I was one of the several economists who proposed a flexible exchange rate 
for Taiwan three decades ago. After the Taiwan government adopted it the economy 
seemed to function well.  
 
Let us consider two questions: First, what exchange rate regime should China adopt? 
Second, given the current regime of a managed float should the RMB be revalued? Since 
the Chinese government has already declared its position to adopt a more flexible regime 
in the long run as the situation permits, I should not comment on the first question. 
Making recommendations on policy which is already decided is fruitless. Let me just 
point out that in the adoption of a suitable exchange rate system the Chinese government 
is practicing its tried and proven method of reform of economic institutions, namely, 
gradualism and experimentation in order to decide on a good system and when to adopt 
it.  
 
On the second question many foreign governments including the US government have 
pressured the Chinese government to raise the value of the RMB for their own benefits. 
Some US economists including Alan Greenspan have said that the effect of the exchange 
rate of the RMB on the US economy is rather limited. Concerning the effect on the 
Chinese economy, I believe that the RMB is still undervalued and revaluation is good for 
the Chinese economy. We have witnessed the undervaluation of the RMB or the 
overvaluation of the dollar in terms of the RMB by the excess supply of the dollar in the 
foreign exchange market in China due to its high price and the resulting accumulation of 
a large amount of foreign exchange reserves in China in the amount of over 700 billion 
US dollars. The increase was over 200 billion just in 2004 alone. An undervalued RMB 
has caused the large export surplus and large inflow of foreign investment and the   6
associated large inflow of foreign exchange reserves. The inflow of foreign exchange has 
been converted into RMB and has caused a rapid increase in money supply M2 in 2002. 
The rapid increase in money supply has led to great increases in investment and output in 
2003-5 and in prices in 2004-5 (while from 1998 to 2002 China had a very stable or 
slightly decreasing price level). A more detailed discussion of the effects of money 
supply on aggregate output and prices can be found in Chow and Shen (2004). 
 
Thus the undervalued RMB was a main cause of an overheated Chinese economy in 
2003-4. The Chinese government tried to slow down the overheated economy by the 
administrative means of controlling the extension of credits by banks and limiting the 
number of construction projects. If the banks had had no extra money to lend out in the 
first place, there would have been no need to control the amounts of bank credit and to 
restrict investment in construction which was financed by such credits. Thus an 
undervalued RMB is the culprit of the overheated Chinese economy. To solve the 
potential problem of overheating and inflation in the future the government needs to raise 
the value of the RMB substantially. Another reason for revaluation of the RMB is that a 
high valued RMB would enable the Chinese to buy more imports for consumption and 
economic development rather than accumulating an extremely large amount of foreign 
reserves that are mostly lying idle or earning a small amount of interest from investing in 
US Treasury bonds.  
 
3. Transfer of Information and Technology 
 
Together with the flow of goods and capital is the transmission of information and 
technology. This has benefited China by upgrading its technology. So far China has 
mainly been an importer of technology but it will soon be an important exporter as it is 
already an exporter of technology to some less developed countries. In recent years the 
Chinese government has spent a large amount on higher education and Chinese 
universities, especially the top ones, improved rapidly. See Chow and Shen (2005). This 
will help China to become one of the world leaders in technology. 
 
As of today, China has already helped many developing countries in Asia and in Africa 
by investing in these countries, providing them with technology, labor and assisting them 
in economic development in general. China seems to have done very well in this regard, 
in view of the fact that it has its own poor regions to develop also. Chinese diplomacy is 
based on mutual respect, treating a small country as equal and trying to help solve its 
problems if it is feasible. The effort of the Chinese government in assisting the 
developing countries and its diplomatic posture as a friendly country are doing as much 
in increasing China’s influence in the world scene as its rising economic power. 
 
Returning to China as an importer of technology, we know that the import of technology 
from the US to China is good for China, but is it good for the US? A part of the answer is 
yes. The main reason for capital and technology to move from US to China is to get a 
higher return to capital. It raises US GNP as I have explained and that is good for the US. 
In the very long run, however, one can make a case that this transfer of technology might 
be bad for the US although it is not necessarily so. To make the case, the transfer may   7
enable China to improve its technology in the future to a point when it will overtake the 
US in the industries in which the US now has monopoly power. To illustrate, when the 
Japanese took over much of the monopoly power of the US automobile industry in the 
1950s and 1960s, the US lost is comparative advantage in producing automobiles. One 
can argue that the transfer of technology in producing automobiles from the US to Japan 
was bad for the US. See Samuelson (2004) which makes the simple point that when there 
is technological change that improves the technology of country 1 (China) in the 
production of good 1 in a two-good economy, the welfare of country 2 (United States) 
may decrease if it can no longer specialize in producing good 1 and does not engage in 
trade with China.  
 
This above argument that the US may lose economically by transferring technology to 
China is different from the fear of military threat from China after it acquires the 
technology. The fear of military threat can justify restricting the transfer of military 
technology to China. I personally believe that the Chinese government has no desire for 
military expansion but many Americans have an opposite view. This is not an issue that 
can be settled by further discussion in this essay. 
 
4. Migration of People 
 
Fourth, about the movement of people. The Chinese have moved to many parts of the 
world to find jobs, to settle down or to get educated. They have contributed to the 
countries where they have settled or are visiting. The out migration of Chinese has been 
considered a problem for China especially when the emigrants are educated or have 
skills. The problem is called brain drain. This problem was considered an issue much 
discussed in Taiwan in the 1970s but is not considered a serious problem in China today. 
I do not consider it a problem for China. Even when the overseas Chinese live abroad, 
they are helping China by short-term visits as lecturers, traders and advisers. More 
overseas Chinese will return as opportunities improve in China as the number returning 
has continued to increase in recent years. People moving to live and work in China have 
benefited China also. They show the Chinese how to improve their life style by living in 
other ways if desired and may help improve the legal system and legal behavior of the 
Chinese people. Here again the free movement of people has more benefits to the movers, 
to their home countries and to the host countries than possible harm. Sima Qian’s 
statement “So cheap goods will go where they will fetch more, while expensive goods 
will make men search for cheap ones” applies not only to the free flow of goods, but of 
capital and people as well.  
 
In China’s economic globalization there is one aspect of the movement of people which 
is very important and unique and is independent of foreign investment and foreign trade. 
This is the movement of overseas Chinese all around the world who are educated and 
experienced in their profession and are willing to return to China to give lectures and 
advice in the process of reform and development. This is an important component of the 
human capital contributing to China’s economic development. It is unique to China in 
terms of the number of overseas people involved and their willingness to help, although 
Israel has had a similar experience as well. The contrast with the case of Russia’s   8





After examining the facts of globalization for China we can all recognize that the open-
door policy first advanced by Deng Xioping when China had a very different ideology 
has been a great success in helping to modernize China. The dream of the Chinese people 
for over one hundred sixty years since the Opium War of 1840 to modernize China has 
been finally realized. A main contribution to the modernization process is the open-door 
policy which allows globalization to take place. 
 
In this essay we have surveyed the four important aspects of globalization in China’s 
economic reform and development since 1978. Understanding the nature and historical 
development of China’s open-door policy for the purpose of modernization will enable us 
to appreciate the forces at work that will propel China’s economic growth in the future 
and the role of China in the world economic community.  
 
   9
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Appendix on RMB revaluation 
 
Exchanges between Ron McKinnon and Gregory Chow 
 




I happen to disagree with much of your WSJ article and provide my comments below. 






From Wall Street Journal article of July 29 by McKinnon with comments by Chow. 
 
On July 21, 2005, China again gave in to concerted foreign pressure—some of it no 
doubt well intentioned—to give up the fixed exchange rate it had held and grown into 
over the course of a decade. Congress had threatened to pass (and may still do so) a bill 
that would impose an import tariff of 27.5% on Chinese imports unless the renminbi was 
appreciated, and had pressured the Bush administration to retain China’s legal status as a 
“centrally planned” economy (despite its wide open character) so that other trade 
sanctions—such as anti-dumping duties—could be more easily imposed. 
A decade ago, when negotiations over China’s entry into the WTO began, a raft of Wall 
Street banks, investment banks, insurance companies, and other financial institutions 
subsequently pressured the U.S. Treasury to require China to loosen its capital controls 
and gradually permit the entry of foreign firms into China’s domestic financial markets—
even though these financial conditions were not required of other WTO member 
countries. China is complying with these terms, as well as eliminating tariffs and quotas 
on imports beyond what was required by the WTO agreement. 
While (uncertain) currency appreciation or the premature dismantling of capital controls 
on currency inflows and outflows are not as malign as an opium plague, the danger to 
China’s heretofore robust economic growth and great success in lifting large numbers of 
people out of abject poverty should not be underestimated.  
 
Chow: There is no substantial causal relation between China’s growth and a fixed 
exchange rate. Note that China’s exchange rate v. the dollar was changed several times 
during this growth period. (A)  11
By holding the exchange rate of 8.28 Yuan to the dollar constant for almost 10 years, and 
building monetary policy around this anchor, China’s rate of inflation in its CPI has 
converged to that in the U.S., at a low level of about 2% per year.  
 
Chow: Here also, China had low inflation not because of the fixed exchange rate but 
because of the restrictive monetary policy of Zhu Rongji (low rate of growth of money 
supply) from 1996 to 2002. (B) 
 
In part because other East Asian countries (except Japan) were also more or less pegged 
to the dollar in a region where almost all trade is invoiced in dollars, the fixed dollar 
exchange rate was a very successful anchor for China’s monetary policy. This collective 
dollar pegging within East Asia also ensured exchange stability and price-level 
alignment, which allowed regional trade and investment to grow rapidly and efficiently. 
Under the fixed rate, China’s own high GDP and productivity growth were particularly 
impressive.  
 
Chow: No causal effect between the fixed exchange rate and GDP in the Chinese case, 
although for some developing countries which could not impose monetary discipline a 
fixed exchange rate is good in forcing them to do so. (C) 
 
However, on July 21, the renminbi was appreciated by 2%—a small amount in and of 
itself—while a narrow band of 0.3% on either side was maintained. More important was 
the implicit announcement that the old “parity” rate of 8.28 Yuan per dollar was being 
abandoned, but there was no clear statement of how the heavily managed float would 
evolve. Now that the future exchange rate has become uncertain, executing monetary and 
foreign exchange policy in China will be much more difficult. I have five negative 
comments on the new policy: 
(1) With the fixed exchange rate now unhinged, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) will 
have to come up with a new anchor or rule that governs monetary policy. None was 
announced when the PBC let the exchange rate go. Will the PBC institute an internal 
inflation target? What will be the financial instruments it uses to achieve this target? 
 
Chow: If the people’s bank watches out for the growth of money supply why would it 
need a new anchor? (D) 
 
(2) Because China’s inflation rate had converged to the American level (or slightly less), 
any substantial sustained appreciation of the RMB (the Americans want 20% to 25%) 
will drive China into deflation—preceded by a slowdown in exports, domestic 
investment, and GDP growth more generally.  
 
Chow: Substantial appreciation of the RMB will have an opposite effect: if we believe 
that rapid growth in money supply will cause inflation, then appreciation of the RMB will 
reduce trade surplus and the inflow for foreign reserves which have been turned into 
RMB to cause inflation in 2004-5. Appreciation of RMB will reduce inflation. (F) 
   12
(3) If the PBC allows only small appreciations (as with the 2% appreciation announced 
on July 21) with the threat of more appreciations to follow, then hot money inflows will 
accelerate. If China attempts further financial liberalization such as interest rate 
decontrol, open market interest rates in China will be forced toward zero as arbitrageurs 
bet on a higher future value of the RMB. China is already very close to falling into a 
zero-interest liquidity trap much like Japan’s—the short-term interbank rate in Shanghai 
has fallen toward 1%. In a zero-interest liquidity trap, the PBC (like the Bank of Japan 
before it) would become helpless to combat deflationary pressure. 
 
Chow: I agree with the speculative inflow of hot money due to small increases in the 
exchange rate, but the solution is to change the exchange rate by one big step, as china 
did in the 1980s up to the mid-1990s. (G) 
 
(4) Any appreciations, whether large and discrete or small and step-by-step, will have no 
predictable effect on China’s trade surplus. The slowdown in economic growth will 
reduce China’s demand for imports even as exports fall so that the effect on its net trade 
balance is indeterminate. 
 
Chow: Ron, I must have failed my econ 101 on foreign trade. I thought that increasing 
the value of RMB will make Chinese goods more expensive abroad and foreign goods 
cheaper in china, both tending to reduce china’s trade surplus. Of course the above 
depends on elasticities of demand for imports of Chinese goods abroad and of demand for 
foreign goods in china. Since there are substitutes the elasticities tend to be high. (H) 
 
(5) Because the effect of appreciations on China’s trade surplus will be ambiguous, 
American protectionists will come back again and again to complain that any 
appreciation is not big enough. So abandoning the “traditional” rate of 8.28 yuan per 
dollar will, at best, result in only a temporary relaxation of foreign pressure on China. 
 
Chow: This point might be valid! 
 
* * * 
Lest you think that my assessment of China’s new policy is too negative, compare it to 
the experience of Japan two decades ago and earlier. From the 1980s into the mid 1990s, 
Japan-bashing was in vogue in the U.S., much as China-bashing is in vogue today. Back 
then, Japan had the biggest bilateral trade surplus with the U.S. and was continually 
threatened (more by the Congress than the president) with trade sanctions unless there 
were temporary “voluntary” export restraints on particular exports, and the yen be 
allowed to appreciate. Indeed, the yen appreciated episodically all the way from 360 to 
the dollar in 1971 to touch 80 to the dollar in April 1995. This unhinged the Japanese 
financial system (the bubble economy of the late 1980s) and eventually resulted in 
Japan’s unrelenting deflationary slump of the 1990s—its “lost” decade. Japan has yet to 
recover fully and remains today in a zero-interest liquidity trap, which prevents the Bank 
of Japan from reigniting economic growth. And Japan’s trade surplus as a share of GNP 
has not been reduced in any obvious way.  
   13
Chow: I do not know the case of Japan well enough to comment, but I will not easily 
accept the interpretation that the slowdown of the Japanese economy since 1991 is due to 
a flexible exchange rate. Any one making such a statement has to document it carefully 
rather than just stating it. Perhaps you have written extensively on this but the above 
statement “this unhinged the Japanese financial system” alone has not convinced me. 
 
Thanks in large part to pressure from our lawmakers in Washington, China is now in a 
nebulous no man’s land regarding its monetary and exchange rate policies. Instead of 
clear guidelines with a well-defined monetary anchor, its macro economic decision-
making will be ad hoc and anybody’s guess—as was (and still is) true for Japan.  
 
Chow: You may recall that I was one of the several economists who proposed a flexible 
exchange rate in Taiwan. After the Taiwan government adopted the flexible exchange 
rate system the Taiwan economy continued to growth for a long period until the growth is 
now somewhat slower for other reasons. 
 
Mr. McKinnon, a professor of economics at Stanford, is the author, most recently, of 
“Exchange Rates under the East Asian Dollar Standard: Living with Conflicted Virtue” 
(MIT Press, 2005). 
 




Because you are truly the Dean of economists studying China, I am honored that you 
took the time to read my WSJ and rebut it so carefully. The main difference between us is 
that I am a monetary economist who believes that, in an open economy, the exchange rate 
is just the expression of current or intended future monetary policies. But you are more in 
the mainstream in not taking this view. 
 
I marked your main points in capital letters below, and am replying to each one.  
 
(A), (B), and (C): In China’s growth period of the 1980s, it was not a truly open 
economy. State trading companies for imports and exports insulated domestic relative 
prices from foreign—and of course exchange controls on both current and capital account 
predominated. Thus the Chinese authorities could change (depreciate) the official 
exchange rate (as they did several times) without having much effect on the domestic 
price level and monetary policy or growth rates. 
 
    However, by 1994, the economy had much more open with the unification of the spot 
and swap foreign exchange markets and virtually accepting current account 
convertibility. The exchange rate made a big difference to the domestic price level,  
 
[Chow: a questionable proposition, see below] and the over devaluation of the renminbi 
in 1994 when the official exchange rate and swap rates were unified at 8.7 Yuan/dollar 
(the official rate moved from 5.5 to 8.7) greatly aggravated the inflation that had begun in   14
1993 and continued through 1995. 
 
Chow: This is also questionable- see below. In my view (see “Money, Price Level and 
Output in the Chinese Macro-economy” in the “document downloads” section of 
www.princeton.edu/~gchow and section 7.3 of China’s Economic Transformation) a 
major factor affecting the inflation rate in China is the rate of growth in money supply, 
M0, M1 or M2. In particular the inflation in 1993-5 can be explained the rapid growth of 
currency in circulation, 317.9, 433.6, 586.5, and 728.8 (billion) at the end of 1991, 1992, 
1993 and 1994 respectively (see p. 120 of China’s Economic Transformation). This 
happened essentially before the change in the exchange rate system in 1994. We disagree 
on the role of the exchange rate, as compared with the rate of growth of money supply, 
on inflation. I have documented my view about the importance of the rate of growth of 
money supply in the above two references. 
 
     Subsequently, the PBC hung on to 8.28 Yuan per dollar for 10 years through both 
deflationary and inflationary pressure until Sept 21, 2005. And in China’s CPI price 
inflation in 2005, when the economy has become very open, has converged to being 
slightly less than that in the United States. I am not claiming that the exchange rate by 
itself anchored China’s price level. Rather the government’s use of some direct controls 
on investment, sterilization operations, and so forth, were effectively guided by the 
exchange rate target.  
 
    Of course monetary cum exchange rate policy by itself affects mainly the rate of price 
inflation rather than the real rate of growth. However, I might note in passing that 
economy’s rate of growth was more erratic from 1980 to 1995—with serious inflations in 
1988-89 and again in 1993-95. Since then, under the fixed exchange rate regime, growth 
has been very high, smoother, and without any significant inflationary outbursts.  
 
Chow: There is a short section on “A brief monetary history of China” in “Money, Price 
Level and Output …” to explain the historical facts in your last two paragraphs without 
resort to the exchange rate. 
 
(D) and (F). The rate of growth of the money supply as a target for monetary policy in the 
sense of Milton Friedman is just a non starter in a high growth developing country such 
as China.  
 
Chow: No where do I express agreement to the Friedman’s viewpoint of targeting money 
supply. I do agree with the Friedman’s empirical proposition (pointed out to me by Ben 
Bernanke who also agrees with Friedman) that an exogenous change in money supply 
will increase output soon after but the effect will soon vanish and will raise prices with a 
longer delay but the effect is longer lasting. To the extent that an undervalued RMB leads 
to more inflow of foreign exchange reserves (now of 700 billion dollars, with an increase 
of about 200 billion just in 2004 alone) which are converted to RMB, thus raising the rate 
of increase in money supply, the undervaluation is inflationary.  
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The rapid rate of financial transformation and very high saving means that all monetary 
aggregates tend to grow explosively. For example, from 1995 to 2003 narrow money in 
China grew over 17 percent per year (See Table 2 of attached paper, “Exchange Rate or 
Wage Changes in International Adjustment?”) and the broader aggregates grew even 
faster.  
 
Chow: 17 percent is not high for China for price stability from the viewpoint of the 
demand for money having an income elasticity over unity. Demand for money as the 
Chinese economy grows increases at a higher rate than GDP. The inflationary periods 
were those in which the rate of growth of money supply exceeded 25-30 percent—see 
table on p. 120 of China’s Economic Transformation. 
 
The monetary authority cannot simply “watch” the money supply and decide whether 
money growth is too fast or slow. Rather, it is better to treat growth in monetary 
aggregates as endogenous (not causal), and look for some other anchor to guide 
tightening or easing monetary policy. And for China over the past 10 years, the exchange 
rate has been the most convenient one, but since July 21 it might have to move to 
domestic inflation targeting.  
 
Chow: In China, much of the growth of money supply (again see the above cited section 
of “A brief monetary history of China” ) was due to government policy, though not 
intended to control inflation. For example, currency in circulation increased by 50 percent 
in one year 1984 because of reform of the banking system leading to banks being given 
freedom to extend credits in ways not allowed before. Rapid increases of money supply 
in 1993-4 was the result of the banks extending credit in response to Deng’s call in his 
famous speech in Shenzhen in 1992 for further opening and rapid development. The 
success of Zhu Rongji in controlling inflation since the mid 1990 was by controlling bank 
credit and money supply using administrative means—imposing quotas to banks in each 
province. I am not advocating monetary targeting, but am pointing out that monetary 
aggregate is one of the variables that we should watch out for, including its rapid rise 
resulting from people converting dollars to RMB. 
 
G. Because China’s CPI inflation is now less than American at around 2 percent per year, 
and virtually all goods traded in East Asia are dollar invoiced, a large appreciation of the 
RMB will drive China into actual deflation.  
 
Chow: A large appreciation will reduce the growth of money as compared with no 
appreciation. Actual deflation will depend on the growth of money itself which depends 
on other factors a well, such as those mentioned in the last paragraph. 
 
H. Greg: I am sure you did very well in Econ 101. But you learned the wrong model for 
assessing what would happen to the trade balance of a creditor country forced into 
appreciation. See my new book (listed below) with special reference to the problem of 
“conflicted virtue”. Also I attach another short paper called “Trapped by the International 
Dollar Standard”. 
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I. Finally, I have written a book, Dollar and Yen: Resolving Economic Conflict between 
the United States on the Japan (with Kenichi Ohno, MIT Press, 1997) showing how the 
syndrome of the ever high yen from 1971 to 1995 drove Japan into the great deflationary 
slump and zero interest liquidity trap of the 1990s. Japan’s problem is also covered in my 
new 2005 MIT book in chapters 3 and 4, with China being covered in Chapter 5. 
 
I agree with you that Taiwan is too special to discuss. Exchange flexibility itself is not 





I am following up your email and welcome further exchanges on my comments above. 





Comments of Professor X on the MacKinnon-Chow exchanges, Aug 2 
 
1. On your comment on Ron’s point 4, you seem to talk about a partial derivative of 
exchange rate on trade balance, while he is thinking of some more aggregate effect. He 
comes back to this in his point H, where he focuses on the capital loss on US Dollar 
assets from China appreciation. 
 
2. I did not see any disagreement on his point 2. He says sustained appreciation of RMB 
will lead to deflation in China; you say reduced inflation. 
Dear X, 
 
Thanks for the two points. 
 
1. Concerning partial derivative vs. aggregate effect, what does it mean by capital loss on 
US dollars assets? The US dollars can still buy the same (or almost the same) amount of 
US assets in the US or in the world except in China, approximately speaking, even if 
appreciation is of a higher percentage than 2 percent. Does China’s appreciation of the 
RMB make my holding of US assets less valuable or make me poorer? 
 
2. On the point about deflation being the same as less inflation, there is main difference. 
My view is that if China does not appreciate there will be inflation and overheating. 
Hence China should appreciate. MacKinnon’s point is that China should not appreciate 
because doing so will lead to serious deflation which is bad for the Chinese economy. 
 
Am I right? 
Gregory   17
 
 
End of appendix on the MacKinnon-Chow exchanges on revaluation of the RMB. 
 
 
 
 
 